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1213 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE 
AND THE ARTIST 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT 
 
Prince v. City of New York1 
(decided May 31, 2013) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First 
Department recently held that a mandatory fine of $2,000 imposed 
for removing a television antenna, made of recyclable material, from 
the top of a residential garbage receptacle violated the Excessive 
Fines clause of the New York State2 and Federal Constitutions.3 
II. DISCUSSION OF PRINCE 
Petitioner, Albert Prince, a carpenter and sculptor, uses recy-
clable construction material for art installations.4  On February 23, 
2011, Prince removed a television antenna from the top of a garbage 
pile consisting of many garbage bags.5  Prince placed the antenna in 
his vehicle and drove away.6  Shortly after removing the antenna and 
driving away, Prince was pulled-over by a New York City (“NYC”) 
Sanitation police officer.7  The officer “issued [Prince] a summons 
for unauthorized removal of residential recyclable material using a 
motor vehicle.”8  This was a violation of New York Municipal Code 
 
1 966 N.Y.S.2d 16 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2013). 
2 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 18. 
4 Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 18. 
5 Id. at 17. 
6 Id. at 17-18. 
7 Id. at 18 
8 Id. 
1
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§ 16-118(7)(f)(1)(i).9  Subject to the payment of a $2,000 fine, 
Prince’s car was impounded, thus limiting his ability to work.10  That 
fine for $2,000 was mandatory and could not be altered by the 
courts.11 
A. Procedural Background 
One month after the incident, Prince had a hearing before an 
Administrative Law Judge of the Office of Administrative Trials and 
Hearings.12  At that hearing, the Administrative Law Judge sustained 
the violation because Prince did not present a valid defense.13  Addi-
tionally, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that she lacked 
discretion to reduce the penalty.14 
Prince then appealed to the NYC Environmental Control 
Board (“ECB”).15  On appeal, the board was asked to consider 
whether or not the mandatory penalty was unconstitutional as an ex-
cessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.16  The ECB concluded that it did not have author-
ity to rule on the constitutional issue.17  Subsequent to that decision, 
Prince commenced an Article 78 proceeding against the City of New 
York.18  Prince argued that the fine was unconstitutionally excessive 
and asked that the fine be vacated.19  The New York State Supreme 
Court found no constitutional violations and dismissed the petition.20  
Prince then appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department.21 
III. HISTORY OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT EXCESSIVE FINE’S 
CLAUSE IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Before discussing the First Department’s decision in Prince, it 
 
9 Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 18. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 19. 
12 Id. at 18. 
13 Id. 





19 Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 18. 
20 Id. at 19 
21 Id. 
2
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is important to first have an understanding of the United States Su-
preme Court’s historical analysis relating to the Eighth Amendment’s 
Excessive Fines clause. 
The Supreme Court first considered the application of the Ex-
cessive Fines clause in the 1989 decision of Browning-Ferris Indus-
tries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.22  In Browning-Ferris, 
the Court held that the Excessive Fines clause would not be used to 
overturn a jury’s award of punitive damages in a civil trial.23  The 
importance of Browning-Ferris lies not in the decision, but in the fact 
that it was the Court’s first articulation of the analysis it would use to 
determine whether or not there has been a violation of the Excessive 
Fines clause.24 
The Browning-Ferris case arises out of a unique set of facts 
involving waste-collection and disposal businesses.25  Browning Fer-
ris Industries, Inc. is the operator of a waste collection business.26  In 
1973, a Vermont subsidiary of Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 
(Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc.) (“Browning-Ferris”), 
entered the Burlington Vermont trash collection market, and in 1976, 
offered a roll-off garbage collection service.27  Kelco Disposal, Inc., 
owned by a former Browning-Ferris employee, entered the market as 
a direct competitor of Browning-Ferris.28  Kelco, who gained a 43% 
market share, threatened the Browning-Ferris business and prompted 
Browning-Ferris to use predatory tactics to drive Kelco out of busi-
ness.29  Kelco sued Browning-Ferris alleging a violation of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act for the attempted monopolization of the roll-off 
market in Burlington.30  Additionally, Kelco claimed interference 
with contractual relations.31  A jury for the United States District 
Court for the District of Vermont found Browning-Ferris liable on all 
counts.32  After a trial on damages, the jury rendered a verdict for 
 
22 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
23 Id. at 260. 
24 Id. at 262. 
25 Id. at 260. 
26 Id. 
27 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 261. 
31 Id. 
32 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262. 
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both compensatory and punitive damages33 and Browning-Ferris sub-
sequently appealed both the judgment of liability and damages to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.34  The Second 
Circuit affirmed the judgment and noted that if the Excessive Fines 
clause applied to the punitive damage award, the award was not dis-
proportionate enough to be considered excessive.35 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the question 
of whether the punitive damages awarded violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines clause.36  The Court, in an opinion au-
thored by Justice Blackmun,37 held the Excessive Fines clause did not 
apply to the award of damages in a civil trial where the government 
did not prosecute the action and did not seek a share of the awarded 
damages.38 
The Court’s decision presented an evaluation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s historical development.39  The Court initially noted 
that at the time of its adoption, the Eighth Amendment was subject to 
little debate because many of the original states had some equivalent 
protection against excessive fines.40  The Court found there was no 
direct evidence of the meaning of the word “fine.”41  Therefore, the 
Court looked at the plain meaning of the term fine, in the context of 
its adoption into the amendment, to determine fine meant a payment 
to the government as punishment for wrongdoing.42  From this con-
clusion, the Court held the Excessive Fines clause did not apply to a 
punitive damage award in a private civil trial.43  The Court held the 
primary purpose of the Eighth Amendment was to protect the people 
from the government’s abuse of its prosecutorial power.44 
The Court bolstered its finding by pointing to similar lan-






37 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 258. 
38 Id. at 264. 
39 Id. at 264-68. 
40 Id. at 264. 
41 Id. at 265. 
42 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265. 
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17th century, English judges imposed steep fines on the enemies of 
the king, an abuse of power remedied by the protection from Exces-
sive Fines.46  The Court understood the United States Constitution’s 
Excessive Fines clause to be a derivative of the English Excessive 
Fines clause, which clearly supports the Court’s decision, namely that 
the clause is a limit on the ability of the sovereign to use prosecutori-
al power.47 
Thus, the Court limited the application of the Excessive Fines 
clause to instances of fines imposed by the government.48 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL EXCESSIVE FINES CASES 
RELIED UPON BY THE COURT IN PRINCE 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Browning-Ferris, the 
Court decided two other cases, discussed below, further expounding 
upon the application of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines 
clause. 
A. Austin v. United States49 
In August of 1990, Richard Austin was indicted for violating 
South Dakota’s drug laws.50  Austin pled guilty to possession of co-
caine with the intent to distribute and he was subsequently sentenced 
to serve seven years in prison.51  The United States filed an in rem 
proceeding to recover Austin’s mobile home and auto body shop, in-
strumentalities of his crime.52  At trial, Austin contended that forfei-
ture of the property violated his Eighth Amendment rights.53  Here, 
the Supreme Court had to decide whether the civil proceeding requir-
ing forfeiture of property was within the scope of the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.54  The Supreme Court deter-
mined that punishments serving punitive and deterrent purposes come 
 
46 Id. at 267. 
47 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 267. 
48 Id. at 268. 
49 509 U.S. 602 (1993). 
50 Id. at 604. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 605. 
54 Austin, 509 U.S. at 610. 
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under the protection of the Excessive Fines Clause.55  The alterna-
tive—a fine serving a remedial purpose—is not protected by the Ex-
cessive Fines clause.56  The Supreme Court did not evaluate the claim 
any further and provided no guidance for the District Court to deter-
mine what constitutes an excessive fine.57 
B. United States v. Bajakajian58 
In Bajakajian, the Supreme Court provided a proper frame-
work for an Excessive Fines clause analysis. 
In June of 1994, Hosep Bajakajian and his family attempted 
to leave the country with over $300,000 in cash.59  When first ap-
proached by a customs inspector, who informed Bajakajian of his du-
ty to report all cash in his possession in excess of $10,000, Bajakajian 
claimed that he had $8,000 and his wife had $7,000.60  A subsequent 
search revealed that Bajakajian was actually in possession of 
$357,144 in cash.61 
Before trial, Bajakajian pled guilty to willfully transporting 
more than $10,000 outside of the United States.62  Therefore, at trial, 
the court had to determine whether forfeiture of the total amount of 
money was an appropriate sentence.63  After a bench trial, the trial 
court found the forfeiture imposed to be a violation of the Excessive 
Fines clause.64  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
the forfeiture was a per se violation of the Excessive Fines clause and 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.65 
The Supreme Court first had to determine whether the forfei-
ture of the currency was remedial or punitive.66  Determining that the 
forfeiture was punishment, the Court then had to answer the question 
of whether the fine was excessive.67  The Court developed its test for 
 
55 Id. at 618. 
56 Id. at 621. 
57 Id. at 622. 
58 524 U.S. 321 (1998). 
59 Id. at 324-25. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 325. 
62 Id. 
63 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 325. 
64 Id. at 326. 
65 Id. at 327. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 328, 334. 
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excessiveness from the cases which interpreted the Cruel and Unusu-
al Punishment clause to the Eighth Amendment and settled upon a 
test of proportionality.68  The Court compared the punishment to the 
gravity of the offense, and if the punishment outweighed that gravity, 
the punishment was unconstitutional.69  Ultimately, the Court in 
Bajakajian found the forfeiture “grossly disproportionate to the gravi-
ty of [the] offense.”70 
V. ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK’S EXCESSIVE FINES 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. County of Nassau v. Canavan71 
This New York State Court of Appeals case dealt with the 
forfeiture of property which was used as the instrumentality of a 
crime—an automobile driven by an intoxicated individual.72  The de-
fendant, Michaele Canavan, was arrested and charged with driving 
while intoxicated in her 1995 Saturn automobile.73  As incident to her 
crime, Canavan’s car was seized and Nassau County instituted an ac-
tion for forfeiture pursuant to the County’s Administrative code.74  In 
determining the question of whether the forfeiture violated the state 
and federal Excessive Fines Clause, the Court of Appeals followed 
the reasoning of Austin and Bajakajian.75  The court first determined 
the forfeiture was a punishment.76  Then the court applied the propor-
tionality test.77  The court considered multiple factors in making its 
determination as to whether the fine was disproportionate to the grav-
ity of the offense.78  The factors included: 
[T]he seriousness of the offense, the severity of the 
harm caused and of the potential harm had the defend-
ant not been caught, the relative value of the forfeited 
 
68 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336-37. 
69 Id at 337. 
70 Id. at 339-40. 
71 802 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 2003). 
72 Id. at 620. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 621. 
76 Canavan, 802 N.E.2d at 621. 
77 Id. at 621-22. 
78 Id. at 622. 
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property and the maximum punishment to which the 
defendant could have been subject for the crimes 
charged, and the economic circumstances of the de-
fendant.79 
The court ultimately determined that the forfeiture was not dispropor-
tionate to the harm caused by the offense of driving while intoxicat-
ed.80 
VI. THE FIRST DEPARTMENT’S DECISION IN PRINCE 
A. Analysis of Whether the Civil Fine Could be 
Considered an Excessive Fine 
The City of New York argued that the Excessive Fines clause 
jurisprudence was limited to the realm of criminal and not civil cas-
es.81  However the court held that civil penalties are subject to analy-
sis under the Excessive Fines jurisprudence.82  This holding is con-
sistent with the discussion of the Excessive Fines clause in Browning-
Ferris.83  As previously noted, the United States Supreme Court has 
held the Excessive Fines clause “does not constrain an award of 
money damages in a civil suit when the government neither has pros-
ecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages 
awarded.”84  Though only dicta in Browning-Ferris, the Supreme 
Court strongly suggested that the application of the Excessive Fines 
clause is not confined to criminal cases.85  Similarly, the Supreme 
Court in Austin further elaborated on the principle first enunciated in 
Browning-Ferris when it held payments exacted by the government 





81 Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 20. 
82 Id. 
83 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 263-64. 
84 Id. at 264. 
85 Id. at 263-64. 
86 Austin, 509 U.S. at 609-10. 
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B. Was the Fine A Punishment or Was the Fine 
Remedial? 
The court in Prince began its Excessive Fines clause evalua-
tion by determining whether or not the fine was more than remedial 
compensation for the harm.87  The court correctly determined that the 
pertinent question was whether the fine constituted punishment.88  
The court followed Austin, noting any purely remedial fine cannot be 
said to fall under the Eighth Amendment.89  Continuing to rely on 
Austin, the court noted that where a civil fine serves, at least in part, 
as a deterrent and is retributive, it is punitive and subject to the Ex-
cessive Fines clause.90  The court in Prince did not recount the analy-
sis conducted by the United States Supreme Court in Austin where 
the Court described in great detail the history and development of the 
Eighth Amendment to explain why there is constitutional protection 
from Excessive Fines.91  The court in Prince reviewed the facts and 
the legislative history of the pertinent ordinance and determined that 
the fine did not have the sole purpose of being remedial.92  The court 
looked specifically at the relationship of the fine to the actual loss 
sustained by the City as per Bajakajian.93  Noting the legislative his-
tory, the court found clear evidence that the fine was intended to be a 
deterrent.94  Therefore, the court properly concluded the penalty was 
subject to an Eighth Amendment analysis.95 
C. Application of the Proportionality Test 
After its initial determination, the court then applied the pro-
portionality test, continuing to apply principles of Bajakajian.96  The 
court noted proportionality requires that the amount of the fine must 
bear a close relationship to the gravity of the offense that it punish-
 




91 Id. at 21; see Austin, 509 U.S. at 610-11 (discussing the history of the Eighth Amend-
ment and punishment). 
92 Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 21. 
93 Id. (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 329) (noting that forfeiture did not serve the remedial 
purpose of compensating the government for a loss). 
94 Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 21. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 21-22. 
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es.97  The court then listed the appropriate factors that courts should 
consider in determining gross disproportionality: (1) “seriousness of 
the offense”; (2) “severity of the harm caused and the potential harm 
had the defendant not been apprehended”; (3) “the maximum fine to 
which the defendant could have been subject”; and (4) “the defend-
ant’s economic circumstances.”98  The court determined that the seri-
ousness of the offense was minor; no significant harm was caused by 
Prince’s conduct and no potential harm was caused to either the own-
er of the antenna or anyone else in the area had Prince not been 
caught; Prince was subject to maximum punishment for the offense; 
Prince had limited economic circumstances—evidenced by the fact 
that he could not work without his van; and he was a first time of-
fender.99 
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE APPROACHES 
A. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit Dissects the Decisions of Austin and 
Bajakajian 
The first Second Circuit case addressing the Excessive Fines 
clause was United States v. Milbrand.100  In Milbrand, the United 
States government initiated an action for forfeiture of Marcia 
Milbrand’s eighty-five acre property in Pembroke, New York, which 
was used for growing marijuana.101 
In August of 1990, police searched the property and found 
numerous marijuana plants being grown on the property by Marcia’s 
son, Mark.102  Mark was charged with and subsequently pled guilty, 
in state court, to criminal possession of marijuana.103  The United 
States then brought an action for forfeiture of the land used to grow 
the marijuana.104  At trial, Milbrand argued that the taking of her 
property violated the Excessive Fines clause.105  The district court re-
 
97 Id. at 22. 
98 Id. 
99 Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 22. 
100 58 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995). 
101 Id. at 842. 
102 Id. at 843. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 843. 
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jected the argument without much analysis.106  The Second Circuit 
also rejected the Excessive Fines argument, but it provided some 
basic tenets for analyzing such a claim.107  The court set forth a fac-
tor-based analysis for determining whether the forfeiture of property 
was a violation of the Excessive Fines clause.108  It stated: 
In our view, the factors to be considered by a court in 
determining whether a proposed in rem forfeiture vio-
lates the Excessive Fines Clause should include (1) the 
harshness of the forfeiture (e.g., the nature and value 
of the property and the effect of forfeiture on innocent 
third parties) in comparison to (a) the gravity of the of-
fense, and (b) the sentence that could be imposed on 
the perpetrator of such an offense; (2) the relationship 
between the property and the offense, including 
whether use of the property in the offense was (a) im-
portant to the success of the illegal activity, (b) delib-
erate and planned or merely incidental and fortuitous, 
and (c) temporally or spatially extensive; and (3) the 
role and degree of culpability of the owner of the 
property.109 
In applying these factors, the Second Circuit determined that the for-
feiture was not excessive, and thus, did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.110 
Building on Milbrand, the Second Circuit next considered the 
Excessive Fines clause in United States v. Collado.111  Similar to 
Milbrand, the Collado case involved forfeiture of property because of 
its use in drug related crimes.112  Sofia Collado and her husband 
owned a three story building in Brooklyn, New York.113  The first 
floor contained a grocery store, which Collado operated.114  The other 
two floors were residential.115  In 1997, law enforcement authorities 
 
106 Id. at 844. 
107 Id. at 844, 847-48. 
108 Id. at 847-48. 
109 Id. 
110 Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 848. 
111 348 F.3d 323 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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uncovered a large-scale narcotics trafficking operation being operated 
out of the building by Collado’s son, Ralph Collado, Jr.116  Ralph 
Collado, Jr. was arrested and convicted on narcotics charges.117  The 
United States brought a civil forfeiture suit against Collado’s proper-
ty to which Sofia Collado alleged an Excessive Fines clause viola-
tion.118  The district court rejected the argument that the government 
taking of the property violated the Excessive Fines clause.119  In ad-
dressing the Excessive Fines violation argument, the district court 
held the forfeiture was not “grossly disproportional to the gravity of 
the offense.”120  The Second Circuit distilled Bajakajian and enumer-
ated the factors necessary to a proper Excessive Fines analysis:121 
(a) the essence of the crime of the respondent and its 
relation to other criminal activity, (b) whether the re-
spondent fit into the class of persons for whom the 
statute was principally designed, (c) the maximum 
sentence and fine that could have been imposed, and 
(d) the nature of the harm caused by the respondent’s 
conduct.122 
After it applied the factors, the Second Circuit determined that there 
was no violation of the Excessive Fines clause.123 
The final Second Circuit case to consider is von Hofe v. Unit-
ed States.124  In von Hofe, Harold and Kathleen von Hofe argued that 
the forfeiture of their home, where they grew marijuana, was an ex-
cessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment.125  In 2001, local 
police officials and the Drug Enforcement Administration searched 
the von Hofes’ home to find multiple marijuana plants and drug par-
aphernalia.126  The von Hofes were adjudicated under state law, and 
the United States subsequently instituted a property forfeiture ac-
 
116 Collado, 348 F.3d at 325. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 326. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 328. 
121 Collado, 348 F.3d at 328. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 492 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2007). 
125 Id. at 179. 
126 Id. 
12
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tion.127  The von Hofes challenged the action under the Excessive 
Fines clause, and the district court held there was no violation.128 
The Second Circuit evaluated the Eighth Amendment claim 
on appeal.129  The Second Circuit focused its inquiry by considering 
the following: 
(1) [T]he harshness, or gross disproportionality, of the 
forfeiture in comparison to the gravity of the offense, 
giving due regard to (a) the offense committed and its 
relation to other criminal activity, (b) whether the 
claimant falls within the class of persons for whom the 
statute was designed, (c) the punishments available, 
and (d) the harm caused by the claimant’s conduct; (2) 
the nexus between the property and the criminal of-
fenses, including the deliberate nature of the use and 
the temporal and spatial extent of the use; and (3) the 
culpability of each claimant.130 
Here, the Second Circuit focused on the property aspects of the 
case.131  The court ultimately determined that forfeiture of Mr. von 
Hofe’s interest in the property did not violate the Excessive Fines 
clause because of the extent of his criminal activity.132  Conversely, 
the court found that forfeiture of Mrs. von Hofe’s interest was indeed 
in violation of the Excessive Fines clause because of her minimal in-
volvement in the criminal activity.133 
As per Canavan, the New York Court of Appeals, in evaluat-
ing a claim under the Excessive Fines clause will evaluate a specific 
set of factors, but these factors are neatly enumerated compared to the 
Supreme Court cases.134  New York looks at the severity of the harm 
caused and the potential harm had the defendant not been caught, the 
relative value of the forfeited property and the maximum punishment 
to which defendant could have been subject for the crimes charged, 
and the economic circumstances of the defendant.135  It appears that 
 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 181. 
129 von Hofe, 492 F.3d at 181. 
130 Id. at 186. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 188. 
134 Canavan, 802 N.E.2d at 622. 
135 Id. 
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the New York courts borrow heavily from Bajakajian, parsing its de-
cision into a set of elements.136 
VIII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE HOLDING AND CONCLUSION 
There are a wide range of punishments that may be consid-
ered proportional or not proportionate, thus indicating the need for a 
case by case determination.  The only clarity we can gain from 
Prince and other federal decisions is the appropriate test of an exces-
sive fine.137 
The First Department has applied the law analogously to the 
applicable federal jurisprudence.138  The case was rightly decided; 
however, it is clear that each case raising such an issue will be decid-
ed on its own particular set of facts. 
Based upon the cases from the United States Supreme Court, 
the case from the New York State Court of Appeals, and the Second 
Circuit, it is clear that courts do not confront Excessive Fines cases 
very often.  Clearly the Excessive Fines cases, when decided, are im-
portant because there is not much case law to evaluate.  Further, it is 
apparent that each case will be decided upon its individual facts.  The 
Prince case stands out because it provides for a structured analysis of 
an Excessive Fines claim.  The Prince case obviously suggested a vi-
olation of the Excessive Fines Clause, but cases of different facts may 
not provide such clear facts for adjudication.  Ultimately, this case 
provides a clear analysis for future courts in New York to follow 







136 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336. 
137 Id. 
138 Prince, 966 N.Y.S.2d at 22. 
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